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Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the 
Permissible, and the rise of Donald Trump 
 
 
In November 2017, the United States elected Donald Trump to the presidency.  
He announced his campaign in a speech that included calling Mexicans rapists, 
he promised to build a wall on the Mexican border, and to ban Muslims entering 
the country.  The explicit racism of his campaign was shocking: the consensus 
prior to this campaign had been racism needed to be dogwhistled, rather than 
announced outright.  It was well known that white Americans harboured high 
levels of racial resentment and implicit bias, but overt racism was nonetheless 
widely thought to be socially unacceptable and death to a nationwide political 
campaign.  This turned out not to be the case.  
 
Many, many books will be written on how this came to pass, but my purpose 
here is to focus on a small linguistic device that I take to have immense power in 
shifting the norms of acceptable speech with respect to racism: what I call a 
racial figleaf.  (There are also figleaves in other areas, but my focus here is on 
those concerned with race.)   A racial figleaf is an utterance1 made in addition to 
an otherwise overtly racist one, that serves the function of calling into question ǤǮǯ
                                                        
1 Sometimes a figleaf might also be something other than an utterance, like a 
symbol or even a person: arguably, non-white spokespeople for the UK 
Independence Party and non-white members of the Trump administration serve 
as human figleaves. 
an utterance that provides a small bit of cover for something that is unacceptable 
to display in public.2   
 
 
 
 
I argue here that racial figleaves are an especially dangerous linguistic device:  
They play a key role in causing changes our beliefs about what a non-racist might 
say, our norms of conversational acceptability, and (as a result) our standards of 
acceptable behavior.  Despite their immensely damaging effects, they have gone 
largely unnoticed and unstudied.  This paper represents a first step toward 
understanding and theorizing the functioning of racial figleaves. 
 
Terminological note: ǮǯǤa broad sense, 
encompassing prejudices of nationality or of religion as well as prejudices that 
map more clearly onto traditional conceptions of race.  This is a bit of an 
oversimplification, as I think there are important differences between these sorts 
of prejudice.3  ǡǯ
present paper.  
 
1. Background: Norms, Resentments, and Processes of Change 
1.1 Mendelberg, Implicit and Explicit Appeals  
Although there have been some recent shifts (more on this soon), it still seems 
correct to say that the overwhelming majority of white Americans do not 
currently self-identify as racists, and they would be horrified by the thought that 
they are guilty of racism.  As Tali Mendelberg (2001) notes, it was not always 
                                                        
2 One consequence of this is that which things figleaves will be used for will vary 
from culture to culture and time to time, depending on which things are 
considered unacceptable to show in public.  
3 I discuss these issues in more detail in my (in progresȌǲǮǯǣǳǤ 
thus:  Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, one could run and win at a national 
level on a platform that included claims of white supremacy and policies of legal 
segregation of the races.  However, Mendelberg, argues, things changed.  At the 
time of her writing (2001, 2008 a, b), American political discourse was governed 
by what she calls the Norm of Racial Equality.  And yet, she noted, the majority of 
white Americans showed remarkably high levels of what psychologists call ǲǳǡǲǡ
Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their 
way up. Blacks should Ǥǳ (Tesler and 
Sears 2010: 19) 
 
Mendelberg argued that this situation gave rise to a very specific sort of political 
messaging.  She drew a contrast between explicit racial appealsȄdefined as 
those which use explicit racial vocabulary; and implicit racial appealsȄones 
which were far subtler, alluding to race either via images (most famously, the 
Willie Horton ad discussed in her 2001) ǲǳǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  Implicit appealsȄwhat I elsewhere call ǮǯȄvery effectively activate racial attitudes without a voteǯ
awareness, while explicit appeals trigger self-monitoring and are therefore less 
effective.  This is why the Willie Horton advertisementȄ an implicit appealȄ
caused racially resentful voters to support George HW Bush.  And it is also why, ǡǯ
to dissipate (even though his criticism was treated as utterly misguided by 
mainstream media).4  At this point, the appeal ceased to be implicit and became 
explicit, which rendered it ineffective.  Through the 1990s and early 2000s ǯ
workings of implicit and explicit appeals. 
 
Recently, the stark contrast between implicit and explicit appeals seems to have 
dissipated.  There were initial indications of this in work by Huber and Lapinski 
(2006, 2008).  But Mendelberg responded, pointing to potential design flaws in 
                                                        
4 ǲǡǡǳǤ 
their experiments.  More recently, however, Valentino et. al. (2016) appear to 
have demonstrated, in experimental work conducted 2010-2012, that explicit 
and implicit racial appeals can now be equally successful.  Their work is not 
susceptible to Mendelbergǯǡ
explicit racial appeal can work just as successfully on racially resentful subjects 
as an implicit racial appeal.  ǲ
mainstream American politics is no longer dependent upon the ways in which ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ȌǤ  This change is largely attributed to the election of 
Barack Obama, and the subsequent widespread belief that racism is no longer an 
issue.  (Importantly for what follows, however, their examples are not ones of ǯǤȌ 
 
 
1.2 The Norm of Racial Egalitarianism 
One might think this means that the Norm of Racial Egalitarianism is no longer.  
Certainly, the rise of Donald Trump has led to much speculation along these 
lines.  But I think that this is premature, and that there is evidence of this in the 
details of TrǯǤ	ǡǤ
al.  have not demonstrated a conclusion quite as strong as that which they assert 
in the quote above.  They have demonstrated that making race explicit no longer 
nullifies the impact of racial resentment on candidate and policy preferences, a Ǥǡǯ
anything goesȄǲ
politics is no longer dependent upon the ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ
6).  ǯǤǡ
me that the Norm of Racial Egalitarianism is still in force. 
 ǡǯ Racial 
Equality needs to take.  The majority of white Americans were, after all, said to 
accept the Norm of Racial Equality while displaying high levels of Racial 
Resentment.  Any remotely demanding Norm of Racial Equality would prevent 
one from endorsing items like ǲǡǡ
overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same 
Ǥǳȋ ? ? ? ǣ ? ?ȌǤThe fact that the Norm 
is compatible with the endorsement of statements like these means that the 
norm must be a rather thin one.  Mendelberg never gives us a statement of the 
norm, but she does ǲǳǢǲȏȐthe legal ǳǢǲǳǤǡǲǳȋ ? ?ȌǤ  My working hypothesis is 
that the Norm can be understood as taking the very simple form ǲǯ
ǳ.  Adherents then apply their own understandings of what is required to 
not be racistȄand in many cases, this is not very much. 
 
Here, it is useful to look at the work of Jane Hill, who describes that she calls the ǲǳǤǡ the 
Ideology of Personalism, which holds thatǣǲǡǡǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?Ȍ, by which she clearly means 
conscious beliefs and deliberarely racist intentions and actions.  If we formulate ǲǯǳǡwe realize that the Ideology 
of Personalism is widespread, we begin to see how it is that one who accepts the 
Norm of Racial Equality might also assent to the items on the Racial Resentment ǣǯǡ
to be adhering to the Norm of Racial Equality.  
 
It is also worth noting that the Norm of Racial Equality is not, and has never 
been, in force for everyone in the United States.  Mendelberg speaks of the Norm 
of Racial Equality as either being in operation or not: it was not in force for the 
United States in 1900, and it was in force for the United States in 1988.  And for 
her purposes this makes sense.  The voters that are her focus are those who 
politicians seek to sway via subtle racist manipulationsȄpeople with high levels 
of Racial Resentment, but who nonetheless adhere to the Norm of Racial 
Equality.  But it is of course an oversimplification, for the norm may be in force 
for one group and not for another.  Some Americans, those who identify as white 
supremacists, think it is perfectly acceptable to be openly racist; others do not.   
 ǤǤǯ ? ? ? ?
foul of the Norm of Racial Equality in such a way as to block their influence on 
racially resentful voters.  This suggests that either the norm is not in force, or it is 
no longer right to take it to preclude all explicit racial appeals.  The latter is 
possible if explicit racial appeals are now seen as compatible with not being a 
racist.  This clearly seems to be the case, according to Valentino et. al.  My 
suggestion in this paper is that racial figleaves allow for a further step:  with 
their help, even what would otherwise be seen as blatantly racist statements can 
be seen as compatible with non-racism. First, however, we need some more 
background in place on changes of attitudes and norms. 
 
1.3 Changes in attitudes, norms, permissibility 
Rae Langton (2012) and Mary Kate McGowan (2012) tell a compelling story of 
how certain sorts of shifts in acceptability can take place.  They begin from the 
way that what Lewis (1979) ǲǳǤ
notion here is that of accommodation: if a speaker says something which, for 
example, carries a presupposition, thenȄprovided nobody objectsȄthat 
presupposition is taken on board.  When, for example, ǲǳǡ
presupposition that I have a husband, which can now be taken for granted for 
the rest of the conversation. 
 
 McGowan draws attention to the ubiquity of changes in conversational 
acceptability, arguing that every utterance changesȄat least in a small wayȄ
what is acceptable for that conversation.  Some of these changes will be small 
ones, like the need to take into account what was previously uttered.  But others 
will be much largerȄlike a shift in the acceptability of racist utterances. Langton 
tells a similar story about conversational accommodation (though with a greater 
focus on the role of authority), arguing that that this can then bring about 
psychological changes in speakers, causing them to have attitudes and emotions 
that are appropriate to the racism now being taken for granted.  Langtonǯ and 
McGowanǯn the way that openly racist 
utterances effect significant changes to standards of conversational acceptability.  
If these are made and not challenged, they maintain, the conversational score 
shifts so as to accommodate them as acceptable. 
 
McGowan also notes that racist behavior may become permissible due to 
utterances that are made.  And of course, this may lead to quite devastating 
consequences.  Lynne Tirrell (2012), for example, has shown how the 
legitimation of hateful speech helped to give rise to the Rwandan genocide.  
 
As so far told, however, this story is incomplete.  To see this, consider what 
happens when a white supremacist makes an openly racist utteranceȄthe sort 
ǯ. If she is talking to another white supremacist, 
the remark will not be objected to.  ǯlead to any change in attitudes.  
The meeting of minds of two people with repugnant sentiments is obviously no 
good thing, but there is no reason to think that it will move others in a more 
racist direction.  Now, consider what happens when a white supremacist makes 
an openly racist remark to someone who adheres to the Norm of Racial Equality.  
Langton and McGowan suggest that if nobody objects, the racist presuppositions 
will generally be taken on board and begin to affect both the psychological states 
of conversational participants and permissibility facts more broadly.   
 
But how likely is it that nobody will object?  ǡǯ
turn to the actual example McGowan uses (2012:121). 
Imagine that an African American man boards a public bus on which all 
the other passengers are white. Unhappy with the newcomer, an elderly ǡǲǡǡǯ
niggers arouǥǤǡǥǥǨ 
 
It may well be that people will not openly object: confrontation is difficult, and 
people try to avoid it, even more so when race is at issue. ǯ(2001, 
2008 a, b) view was that open mention of race can disarm what would otherwise 
be an effective implicit appeal/covert dogwhistle: adherents to the Norm of 
Racial Equality self-monitor, and will reject what they cannot avoid seeing as 
racist.  ǡǤǤǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ
meaning that open mentions of race may not block the effectiveness of an appeal. 
However, it does not by any means follow from their work that people will be 
untroubled by aggressive hate speech containing a taboo racial epithet, directed 
at an elderly man.5  If, as I have hypothesized, even a thin norm of Racial 
Egalitarianism is still in force, this Ǥǯ
simply be seamlessly assimilated, but insteadȄin some wayȄrejected by those 
who adhere to this norm, even if they are racially resentful.  This rejection might 
consist of mental distancing, changing the topic, or ending the conversation as 
quickly as possible.  But an adherent to the Norm is very unlikely to smoothly 
assimilate the racist assumptions, once they are seen as clearly racist.  How, then, 
do norms shift?  Is there something which allows the sort of assimilation that 
Langton and McGowan posit? 
 
What is missing from their picture, it seems to me, is recognition of a further 
conversational phenomenon: the figleaf.  A figleaf gives an openly racist 
utterance just enough cover that an adherent to the Norm of Racial Equality can ǯǡǡ-racism.  This is necessary 
to make an openly racist utterance seem like something that a non-racist might 
conceivably say and therefore crucial to the sort of conversational 
accommodation that Langton and McGowan draw our attention to.  Without it, 
the psychology of speakers and the permissibility facts will not change.  It is 
therefore vitally important for us to attend to figleaves and how they work in 
conversation6.   
                                                        
5 Their research is on a different topicȄexplicit VS implicit racial political 
appeals, and their effects on the correlation between racial resentment and 
policy preference.  They do not discuss an aggressive utterance of this sort 
(which is not in any way a political appeal), nor are they concerned with 
conversational norms and accommodation. 
6 
ǯǯ
accounts, which is wholly compatible with what they say.  
2. Figleaves 
A racial figleaf is an utterance made in addition to one that would otherwise be 
seen as racist.  Unlike in the case of an implicit appeal/covert dogwhistle, race 
has been explicitly mentioned.  The figleaf provides cover for what would 
otherwise have too much potential to be labeled as racist.  Sometimes the figleaf 
is utǤǡǯǡ
figleaves can sometimes be provided as part of another, later conversation (they 
can even be provided in advance).  The idea is that the figleaf offers some way of 
avoiding a confrontation with the possibility that something racist is going on.  
How well this works varies a great deal from context to context and audience to 
audience.   
 
This paper begins the project of exploring kinds of figleaves and their function.  
We will name some of the most common forms of figleaves, but we will also 
discuss some that are more complex and less easily labeled. 
 
2.1 Synchronic Figleaves 
A synchronic figleaf is one provided at roughly the same time as the utterance for 
which it is a figleaf.  Probably the most easily recognizable figleaf is the classic ǲǯǥǳǡ
explicitly racist.   Van Dijk (1993: 102-103) ǲapparent ǳ
of racism, and Hill (2008: 120) actually treats its intelligibility as a test of overt 
racism, noting that it only makes sense to use this phrase alongside something 
overtly racist.7  ǯ	Ǥ 
 
The classic Denial figleaf attempts to dodge accusations of racism by simply 
asserting that they are not true. It is one of the most straightforward and crude 
of figleaves.  Figleaves like this one are so well-known that there are entire blogs 
                                                        
7 ǯǤǲǯ
racistǡǯǤ
the speaker is racistȄwhy else do they feel the need to assert their non-
racism?Ȅǯǯ
racist view, or that those ǯǤ 
devoted to mocking them8.   They are well known around the world.  To take just 
one example, Van Dijk (82), writing in 1993, cites Jean-Marie LePen, then-leader 
of the Front National: 
(3) We are neither racist nor xenophobic. Our aim is only that, quite 
naturally, there be a hierarchy, because we are dealing with France, and 
France is the Country of the French. 
 
A closely related figleaf is the Friendship Assertion figleaf, which often 
accompanies it.  Its classic form is (2) ȋ ?ȌǡǥȏȐǤ 
I take another form of this to be to be the assertion of a fondness for the group 
attackedȄ ǲǯǳǤ9 They are 
easily recognizable as weak attempts to deflect accusations of racism, and are 
generally not given much credence.  For this reason, they are generally not very 
effective.10  This is why more complex synchronic figleaves are also used, as 
discussed below. 
 
I have defined figleaves in terms of their functionsȄthey are additional 
utterances that serve to undermine the claim that an apparently racist utterance 
is racist.  A Simple Denial figleaf will very often fail to do this.  Technically, then, 
it will in these cases be a merely attempted figleaf. 
 
                                                        
8 http://imnotracistbut.tumblr.com; https://twitter.com/imnotsexistbut. 
9http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/29/donald-trump-blacks-
lawsuit_n_855553.html 
 
10 This, of course, varies substantially from subculture to subculture.  It is also 
worth noting that there are generational aspects to thisȄolder people may find 
it much more natural to insert Simple Denial or Friendship assertion figleaves, 
and may do so out of an abundance of caution.  For example, non-racist members ȀǲǯǡǤǤǤǳǤ
possible that one who asserts this is not in the slightest motivated by racism.  A 
rather tragic consequence, however, will be that someone from outside the ǯ
(where the comment on its own would not have triggered this attribution).  I 
thank Dan Egonsson for pressing me on this point. 
2.1.1 Trump on Mexicans ǯ, with which he began his campaign, 
include a synchronic figleaf: 
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not 
sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots 
of problems, and they're bringing those problems with [them]ǥ ?
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.  11
 
The first thing to note is that the quotation does not explicitly claim that all 
Mexicans are rapists.  Instead, it explicitly associates Mexican immigrants with 
rapists, while at the same time putting in place figleaves.  It focuses not on 
Mexicans, but on the Mexicans who are sent.  This allows for both Trump and his 
supporters to insist that they are not prejudiced against Mexicans.  Instead, they 
have much more specific negative beliefs about some MexicansǤǯǣǲǡǡǳǤ 
added on, to allow a denial that the speaker is making sweeping generalisations ǲǳǤ 
 
The addition of the figleaves to what would otherwise be very clearly racist 
generalisations leaves us with two claims: 
(4) They (the Mexicans who come to the US) are rapists. 
(5) Some of them (the Mexicans who come to the US) are, I assume, good 
people. 
(4) is a generic claim about Mexicans who come to the US.  Generic claims have 
notoriously slippery and confusing and controversial truth conditions, and those 
about social groups have been recently argued to have a crucial role in fomenting 
and perpetuating social prejudice.12  ǯ
important (and widely accepted) facts about generics.  First, they are not 
universal generalisations, but can be trǤȋǲ
                                                        
11 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-
text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ 
 
12 See, for example, Leslie forthcoming; Rhodes, Leslie and Tworek 2012; Wodak, 
Leslie and Rhodes 2015; Haslanger 2011.  But for opposing views see Sterken 
2015a and 2015b; Saul forthcoming. 
ǳcats.) This means we 
can make sense of (4) and (5) being both true without taking it that some rapists 
are good people.  Second, they are nonetheless widely misunderstood as 
universal generalisations.  (We see this every time a generalization about, say, 
the relative incomes of black and white people is met with the objection that 
there are some rich black people.) 
 
This leaves the audience with an interpretation that can, on a very weak version 
of the Norm of Racial Equality, be understood as not racist.  Because the claim is ǡǯ
some of those who come to the US are (or are assumed to be13) good people, 
those who feel drawn to somehow associate Mexicans and rape can nod along 
while not having to see themselves as racist. 
 
And this figleaf serves its purposeǤǯ
to argue that his comments about Mexicans were not racist. 
I think Trump is attacking them based on their actions, not their ethnicity. 
He is addressing the illegal immigrant group, not the race group they 
belong to. 
(https://www.quora.com/Did-Trump-really-make-racist-
comments) 
 
I didn't hear him say anything racist against any race. What I did hear him 
say is, "Illegal Mexicans bring drugs, crime, and are rapists, but I'm sure 
some are good people." Seriously, whats racist about that? 
(Dirk, 
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=2015072821052
1AAWJQfa) 
 ǥǤ 
(Julius Granstrom, 
https://twitter.com/juliusgranstrom/status/6752312383666257
92) 
 
                                                        
13 ǯǮǯǡ
suggesting that Trump is giving them the benefit of the doubt without sufficient 
evidence.  Still, the giving of this benefit of the doubt can be read as an indication 
of non-racism by one with a sufficiently narrow understanding of racism. 
2.1.2 Glenn Beck on Muslims 
Saba Fatima (2013: 341) 
ǯ
synchronic figleaf.  Beck is interviewing Muslim congressman Keith Ellison. 
OK. No offense, and I knǤǤǯ ǤǯǤȄyou ǡǯǡǤǡ ǤǡǲǯǤǳ 
to tell you, I have been nervous about this interview with you, ǡǲǡ ǤǳǯǤǯ ǡǯǡhink a lot of 
Americans will feel that way. 
 ǯǡȋ ?), would seem quite clearly Islamophobic if uttered 
on its own to Ellison. 
(6) Sir, prove to me that you are not working with our enemies. 
 
One way that Beck avoids this is by using a group-based version of the 
Friendship Assertion Figleaf, (7). 
(7) I like Muslims. ǯǤ  ǡǯȋ ?) on its own.  He 
imbeds it in a rumination about what he feels like saying, mentioning it rather 
than using it. 
(6*) And I have to tell you, I have been nervous about this interview with 
you, ǡǲǡ Ǥǳ 
 
This we will call a Mention Figleaf.  It allows Beck (and his supporters) to 
truthfully insist that he did not actually demand that Ellison prove that he is not 
working with the enemy.  He avoids this speech act by mentioning rather than 
using the words that would, if uttered on their own, constitute the act of making 
such a demand. 
 
And then he makes a further move.  He continues with (8). 
(8) ǯǤǯ you of being an enemy, but ǯǡ Americans will feel that way. 
 
Here he explicitly states that he knows Ellison is not working with the enemy, ǲ
ǳǤ Creating such puzzles is often 
crucial to the wǡǯ
paper.  Finally, Beck finishes with an explicit denial that his utterance is an 
accusation.  ǡǡǯ
utterance: Friendship Assertion, Mention, and a more complex further move 
with (8).   
 
2.2 Diachronic Figleaf 
A diachronic figleaf is one applied substantially later than the problematic 
utterance.  Sometimes this is because attention has been drawn to the original 
utterance, and a response is demanded.  Once more, the most obvious and crude 
versions are   Denial and Friendship Assertion.  Here we have Trump, being 
interviewed after making several utterances that were widely taken to show 
anti-black racism, such tweeting as false statistics about black crime taken from a 
white supremacist website and an expression of support for the assault of a 
black protestor at one of his rallies.   
(9) I have great African-American friendships. I have just amazing 
relationships, and so many positive things have happened.14 
 
On its own, this might not be terribly effectiveȄit is so very close to the classic 
claim of a black best friend.  But Trump also used a much more sophisticated 
dischronic figleaf.  In addition to his group-based Friendship Assertion Figleaf, 
Trump weighed in on the topic of  Supreǯ
comments about affirmative action.  Scalia had recently said ǲThere are those 
who contend that it does not benefit African-Americans to get them into the 
University of Texas where they do not do well, as opposed to having them go to a 
less-advanced school, a less -- a slower-track school where they do well,"15 
comments met with widespread outrage.  ǯs comments on the 
controversy came as a surprise:  
                                                        
14 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/13/politics/donald-trump-antonin-scalia-
affirmative-action/ 
15 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/13/politics/donald-trump-antonin-scalia-
affirmative-action/ 
(10) I thought it was very tough to the African-American community, ǥ ?Ǥǡ ?Ǥ
him, I was like, 'Let me read it again' because I actually saw it in print, and 
I'm going -- I read a lot of stuff -- and I'm going, 'Whoa!'16  
(10) uses a much more effective maneuver than the  Denial or Friendship 
Affirmation.  It criticizes someone else for their racism, thus allowing the speaker 
to take the moral high ground and demonstrate what appear to be some anti-
racist convictions.  Once (10) has been uttered, Trump supporters can defend 
him against accusations of racism by noting that he criticized Scalia.17   
 
3. How figleaves work ?ĂŶĚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ 
3.1 Inference-blocking 
A racial figleaf is, generally speaking, an attempt to block an inference from the 
fact that the speaker has made an openly racist utterance R to a claim like (11): 
(11) The speaker is racist. 
Given the ideology of personalism, this blocking will also have the result that the 
utterance R itself is no longer seen as racist.  Blocking these inferences has a 
tremendous felt importance in contexts where the Norm of Racial Equality is in 
force.  These are contǡǯǡ
feel bound by a requirement to not be racistȄhowever they interpret that.  If 
they find themselves inclined to agree with a speaker, they are likely to hesitate 
if the speaker seems to have explicit racist commitments.  Hill argues, rightly, 
that the ideology of personalism makes speaker intention the nearly-exclusive 
                                                        
16 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/13/politics/donald-trump-antonin-scalia-
affirmative-action/ 
17 Although the central notion of figleaf is that of an utterance, it seems to me 
that not-utterances can function just like figleaves.  For example, it is commonly 
believed that no member of a group can be prejudiced against their own group.  
A racist utterance R, then, uttered by a member of the group that R is about, will 
generally be puzzling to the audience.  They will hesitate to infer that either the 
speaker or the utterance is racist.  In such a case, I am tempted to say that a 
person may function as a kind of human figleaf, but this requires broadening the 
notion of a figleaf beyond what I discuss here. 
focus of any discussions that take place regarding racist language, allowing a 
wide range of denials based on ideas like mis-speaking, carelessness, or a good 
heart. My claim here is that figleaves are an important mechanism often involved 
in denials of racism, due to their ability to block inferences to claims like (11). 
 
A Denial figleaf attempts to do this in the most direct way, by simply asserting 
the denial of (11).   The audience in such a case is confronted with an utterance R 
that sounds racist, accompanied by the assertion that the speaker is not racist.  
On its own, the utterance of R might license an inference to (11) fairly quickly.  
But the Denial Figleaf attempts to block this.  How successful this is will depend 
on a number of things.   
 
If the utterance seemed clearly to be the kind of thing that only a racist would say, 
then the inference to (11) is very strong, and the audience will probably doubt 
the figleaf instead.  Ǥǡǲǳȋ ? ?ȌǤ   Similarly, if there is a ǯǡ
will probably doubt the figleaf instead of (11).  Further evidence that might be 
used to cast doubt on the figleaf is knowledge that assertions of non-racism are 
very common among racists, due to the Norm of Racial Equality.  The Denial 
Figleaf will only succeed if none of these factors cause the audience to reject the 
figleaf, which explains why it so often fails. 
 
Other figleaves do this in less direct ways.  The Friendship Affirmation figleaf ǲǳȋ ? ?ȌǤǡǡ 
(incorrect) thought that a racist would not have close black friends.    The 
Mention figleaf works by imbedding the utterance that would have licensed the 
inference to (11) within quotation marks.  This makes it somewhat trickier to ȋ ? ?ȌǤǡǯ
utterance is a racisǤǯǡǡȋ ? ?Ȍ
reasonable inference to many of us. Nonetheless, employing the Mention figleaf 
renders the inference to (11) debatable in a way that it would not have been 
without it.  ǯ defenders can insist that he did not demand that Ellison prove 
that he was not working for the enemy. 
 
One way that a figleaf can be effective is simply by creating a state of confusion Ǥǯǡǡ his 
utterances seemed potentially racist but that his criticism of Scalia casts doubt 
on this.  In order to block the inference to (11), they need not actually reach any 
conclusion about his racism.  A state of confusion and uncertainty will suffice to 
block the condemnation that may seem mandatory under the Norm of Racial 
Equality if (11) is endorsed. 
 
3.2 Shifting permissibility  
 
Due to the Norm of Racial Equality, politicians attempting to exploit racial 
resentments need to be able to deny that this is what they are doing.  Of course, it 
is far easier to make a convincing denial if you have avoided mentioning race.  
This is a significant advantage of using an implicit appeal/covert dogwhistle.  
However, figleaves can be used to provide deniability even when one has been 
more explicit.  Indeed, as we have seen, this deniability may come in the form of 
simply denying racism, as in a Denial Figleaf.  However, the more subtle figleaves 
offer more possibilities.  Glenn Beck, criticized for his interview with Ellison, has 
ample potential to deny any racism by pointing out that he was very explicit 
about not accusing Ellison of working with the enemy.  Donald Trump can insist 
that he is not racist, and point to evidence of his non-racism, like his criticism of ǯǤ 
 
A figleaf has a dramatic effect on a conversation.  In most situations, openly racist 
utterances create substantial discomfort.  It is enormously difficult, socially, to 
accuse someone else of racism.  But, for one who subscribes to the Norm of 
Racial Equality, it is also clear that explicit racism is not acceptable.  A figleaf 
provides a way out of this massively disquieting impasse. If a figleaf has been 
uttered, there is room for doubt about the racism of the utterance, which 
removes the otherwise uncomfortably present obligation to object to racism.  
  
And this is what potentially shifts the boundaries of the permissible.  If nobody 
objects to a racist move, McGowan argues, the racism becomes acceptable.  But, 
as we saw earlier, many explicitly racist utterances will not normally be 
smoothly assimilated where the Norm of Racial Equality is in force.  A figleaf 
alters this dynamic.  An effective figleaf allows explicitly racist utterances to be 
made, without objection.  This means that the process of conversational 
accommodation is able to function in its normal smooth manner, adapting to the 
reality that R, the racist utterance, has been made and not met with any 
objections. 
 
Figleaves (when they work) have the effect of defusing worries about racism.  
Once a figleaf has been effectively deployed, standards for what one can say 
without being racist shift.  And this is powerfully worrying.  If the audience 
accepts that the figleaf blocks the concern about racism arising from the 
utterance of racist sentence R, then R becomes seen as something one can say 
without being racist.  And this will make it far easier to say R, and even to do so 
without figleaves.  Now we have our answer to how the boundaries of the 
permissible can shift.  Among adherents to the Norm of Racial Equality, the 
crucial thing is to reject what is obviously racist.  This allows an adherent to 
believe that they arǲǯǨǳ
counts as obviously racist can, and does, change.  Pair something obviously racist 
with an effective figleaf enough times, and its racism is no longer obvious.  At 
that point, the figleaf may well begin to drop off. 
 
A further effect is on how other utterances are perceived.  As R+Figleaf makes its 
way into our discourse, slightly less racist utterances than R become unshocking.  ǡǡǯȋfigleaf ǲ ?ǳ18) was 
initially shocking.  As it was replayed on the news over and over, it became less 
shocking.  And, crucially, the only slightly less racist call to ban all Syrians came 
                                                        
18 http://www.npr.org/2015/12/08/458875362/trump-on-his-plan-to-ban-
muslims-not-politically-correct-but-i-don-t-care. 
to be seen as the moderate position in the Republican primary. 
 
 
4. Problems/Complexities 
 
4.1 How effective are figleaves? 
While it may sometimes happen that a figleaf is 100% effective and convincing 
for all audiences, this will be rare.  Audiences will differ in the extent to which 
they accept a figleaf as casting into doubt the racism of an utterance.  First, most 
obviously, the group targeted by the utterance is far less likely to accept the 
figleaf.  There are surely very, very few Muslims who doubt Donǯ
bigotry toward them.  ǯ
other complexities.  While he has many admirers who deny that he is racist, 
many others have condemned his utterances as racist.  The figleaves worked 
well with one group, but not with another.  It is overly simple, then, to talk about 
a figleaf simply working or not working.  Even a highly effective figleaf will be 
effective with a particular group and ineffective with others.  Shifts in the 
boundaries of the permissible will also be circumscribed in this way: what 
becomes permissible within one community will not be permissible in another. 
 
4.2 Confused figleaves 
Self-knowledge is a difficult thing, and self-knowledge about racial attitudes is 
especially difficult, given widespread racial resentment combined with a norm 
demanding that one not be racist.  Moreover, people have conflicting attitudes Ȃ 
famously, explicit commitments to anti-racism may coexist with implicit racist 
biases (see e.g. Brownstein 2016). This means that utterers of figleaves may not 
be deliberately engaging in manipulation.  They may genuinely believe all the 
parts of their figleaf, and they may genuinely believe that the figleaf makes their 
utterance non-racist, or even that it demonstrates their lack of racism.  One effect 
of this will be a blocking of self-understanding.  Making a racist utterance, and 
having this be noticed and remarked on, can be a valuable turning point, which 
allows one to learn and change.  Figleaves may block this from happening. 
 It may also be useful to think about figleaves at the level of belief, rather than 
utterance. The Norm of Racial Equality is not just a norm that causes one to 
worry about others considering one to be racist.  It is also one that makes people 
not want to see themselves as racist.  After saying (or even thinking) something 
racist, many people will find themselves worriedȄat least brieflyȄthat they 
might be racist.  At times like this, it is almost irresistible to seek reassurance by 
reaching for evidence that one is not racist.  One kind of evidence can be a figleaf 
at the level of belief. One might think to oneself one of the obvious figleaves: but I 
have a black best friend; or ǯǤOr, perhaps, one might move on to ǯȄquickly ǯǤ 
 
4.3 Figleaves and intention 
It is important to note that a figleaf is defined in terms of its function, not the 
intention behind it.  A figleaf is an utterance made in addition to an explicitly 
racist one, which provides cover by introducing doubt about the racism of the 
utterer, and therefore of the utterance.  Sometimes, as with a racist but clever 
politician, this is intentional.  However, as noted above, sometimes it is due to ǯȄin a case like this it 
seems wrong to describe it as intentional.   
 
I have mostly focused thus far on nefarious, deliberately designed figleaves, ǯǤ
think it is a mistake to focus too much on intention.  What matters most about 
figleaves is their effects. 
 
It is in fact actually possible that Donald Trump thinks both that the Mexicans 
come to the US are generally rapists and murderers, and that some of them are 
good people.  Certainly, a person who believed this might make the same 
utterances about Mexicans that Trump made, with no effort to conceal racism 
from either himself or others.  He might simply believe both of these things.  
There need be no deliberate effort to manipulate.  Importantly, however, this 
ǲǳ
as a figleaf. This utterance still has the effect (for some audiences, anyway) of 
blocking an inference to the claim that the speaker is racist.  And this is what 
matters for the classification as a figleaf. 
 
To focus attention on the intentions behind a figleaf is to buy into the folk theory 
of racism that gives a central role to the Ideology of Personalism. The only 
difference is that the focus now is on the intention behind the figleaf rather than 
on the intention behind the apparently racist utterance.  Our attention will still 
be, wrongly, focused on attempting to discern the state of mind of the speaker, 
and there will always be ways to doubt our judgments about the intention 
behind a figleaf.   
 
But even where it is clear that a figleaf is an intentional manipulation, I think it is 
a mistake to engage in much discussion over intentions.  Why?  Because, as 
hinted earlier and argued below, what really matters about figleaves is their 
ability to change what we see as permissible discourse, in extremely pernicious 
ways.  And intention has nothing whatsoever to do with that.  
 
4.4 The importance of effects 
 
A figleaf provides cover for an utterance that would otherwise be seen as clearly 
racist.  This may in some instances be a deliberate manipulation of the audience 
by a fully explicit racist.  It may in other instances be a back-pedalling by a 
genuinely conflicted person.  It may even occasionally be an attempt to correct a 
genuine instance of mis-speaking.  However, in all of these cases, a successful 
figleaf means that the inference from this utterance to the thought that the 
speaker is racist is blocked.  An utterance of a sentence S that would have been 
clearly racist without the figleaf now comes to be seen as the sort of thing a non-
racist might say.  And since intentions and beliefs of the speaker are the most 
important thing according to the Ideology of Personalism, this means that S 
comes to seem not-racist, or at least not-clearly-racist.  Crucially, this effect takes 
place no matter what intentions and beliefs lie behind the figleaf.   
   ǯǡus to change our 
views on whether an utterance is clearly racist or not, and facilitating the spread 
of racist speech, we should be very worried about their further effects. Lynne ǯ (2012) ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍwork devastatingly 
demonstrates the ways that hate speech can lead to and be a part of genocidal 
violence.  And they are not alone in this.  Indeed, the United Nations condemns 
hate speech.  And crucially, the UN devotes particular attention to hatred-inciting 
effects of speech. 
all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin.19 ǯt an utterance-figleaf combination, and think about what the ǯǤ 
 
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not 
sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots 
of problems, and they're bringing those problems with [them]ǥThey're 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.  20
 
Without the figleaf, this is a clear case of incitement to hatred against Mexicans.  Ǯǯut inciting hatred against them.  Do the 
figleaves mitigate this?  Well, they allow for the possibility of good Mexicans who 
stayed in Mexico; and of an occasional good Mexican in the US.  But if you have 
come to believe that, other than these exceptions, Mexicans are generally rapists, 
group-based hatred has clearly been incited.  The figleaves do nothing to 
mitigate the hatred against the group.  Indeed, by making it more socially 
acceptableȄ ǯȄthey 
may increase the effectiveness of the incitement.  What the figleaves do is to 
                                                        
19 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx 
20 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-
text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ 
 
bring it about that (for an increasingly large group of viewers/hearers) ǲǳ-racist might say.  And this 
way of thinking is, quite obviously, extraordinarily dangerous. 
 
5. Trump, Figleaves, and Where We Stand Now 
 
Trump has used figleaves as a part of his rise to power.  In my view, this does not 
indicate that the Norm of Racial Egalitarianism is dead, despite the fact that some ǯǡǡǤ These ǡǲǯǳ
is the wrong advice.  Nonetheless, this does not seem to be the case for the 
majority of his supporters.  There are a variety of reasons that people may have 
voted for Trump, or refrained from voting for Clinton.  But it seems to me that ǯeassuring some of those who 
adhere to the Norm of Racial Egalitarianism that Trump is not racist. The fact 
that figleaves were used, and discussed by his supporters as evidence of non-
racism shows that the Norm is still in place.   
 ǡǯ ǯǤ
Racial Equality is subject to interpretation, and figleaves are shifting that 
interpretation.  A wall on the Mexican border and a Muslim ban are now being 
considered non-racist, by some who would have found them outrageous just two 
years ago.  And a crucial part of the reason, it seems to me, is that figleaves have ǯǤǡǲǯ ǯ-racist might put 
forward.  This is deeply dangerous, and we have no reason at all to believe that 
the shifting will stop here.  As I write, Trump has moved to appoint known white 
supremacists like Steve Bannon and Jeff Sessions to top posts in his 
administration.  There will be much more to come, and many more figleaves. 
 
The fact that we have moved from dogwhistles to figleaves is highly significant.  
Figleaves, unlike dogwhistles, shift our interpretation of the Norm of Racial 
Equality.  But this is not their only danger.  A further danger is that they allow for 
the open expression of overtly racist content.  A covert dogwhistle merely raises 
to salience pre-existing racial attitudes.  One cannot proclaim a policy which 
explicitly targets a particular racial ǣǲǯǳǤǤ
allows for the announcement of policies that explicitly target particular racial 
groups.  This makes the figleaf a potent device for one aiming to institute 
explicitly racist policies.  And this should make clear the danger that we are in.  
Implicitly or structurally racist polices are terrible.  But even greater harm can 
be done once we allow the move to the explicit. 
 
This means that we must be hyper-vigilant about the use of figleaves, and we 
must not let them distract us from what else is being said and done.  People on 
the left are absolutely right to call for Trump to condemn the hate crimes being 
commited in his name, or to withdraw the appointment of Bannon.  But we must 
bear in mind that if he does either of these things he will have provided himself a 
very useful figleaf.  Supporters will be able to point to these as indicators that he 
is not racist.  We must not lose sight of what these figleaves may cover for.  If 
Muslims are being banned, a wall is being built, and ever more voting restrctions 
on African Americans are being put in place we must continue to point these 
outȄand to make it clear that these are racist.  We must, I think, point to the 
figleaves as figleaves, and explain their power to distort.   It is vitally important 
that we maintain a firm focus on what is being said and done, rather than letting 
the conversation drift to what some additional utterance might indicate about ǲǳǤȄ
for those who want to believe itȄthat someone is not racist in their heart.  We 
must insist that what matters is racism of policies and acts (including speech 
acts). 
 
6. Coda ?&ŝŐůĞĂǀĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ?DƵƐůŝŵĂŶ ? (20 March 2017) 
 
As I put final revisions on this paper, certain key weakenesses of the Explicit 
Racism + Figleaf approach have been revealed.  ǯ as 
President was to issue an executive order banning those from seven majority-
Muslim nations from entering the US.  This ban did not mention Islam or 
Muslims, and arguably represents an effort to return to implicit racial references 
rather than explicit. It was very chaotically-executed, taking effect immediately 
and applying to those already holding visas and even Green Cards. The reaction 
from opponents was instantaneous, enormous, and highly effective, as lawyers 
and protestors descended on airports all over the country.  I think it is highly 
likely the explicit discriminatory intent declared earlier helped to mobilize and Ǥȋǯǡǡ
on everyone.)   
 
Even more important than this reaction from the general public, however, was 
the reaction from the courts.  And this is where we very clearly see the 
weaknesses ǯǤ
attempting to put forward a policy making no explicit reference to Muslims, legal 
authorities drew on previous statements in their reactions to the order.  A policy 
formulated with discriminatory intent falls afoul of constitutional prohibitions 
on religious discrimination, and explicit statements about plans to ban Muslims 
were taken to reveal just such intent.  (Once more, a crucial fact is that the 
figleaves only worked on some audiencesȄthese legal authorities were clearly 
not amongst them.)  Sally Yates, Acting Attorney General until she was fired for 
refusing to defend the order, said that her decision was based in key part on 
previous statements.21  The (ultimately successful) lawsuits filed against the ban 
made reference to such statements: 
[They] offered evidence of numerous statements by the President about ǮǯǤǳ 
Former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani recently said puǣǲȏȐǡǡǮǤǯǤ
                                                        
21 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/30/justice-department-
trump-immigration-acting-attorney-general-sally-yates. 
ǣǮǤǤǯBYǳ22 
After the defeat of the first version of the travel ban, a new version was 
formulatedȄexcluding valid visa and Green Card holders, and to be rolled out in 
a more orderly manner.  But this version was quickly halted by the courts as 
well, again on the basis of these explicit statements. ǡ
ǯǤ ? ?wǯ
ruling ǯǤSo too was ǯǲǳ, along with other statements from ǯǡ-Islamic animus. 
Trump himself took part in the I-will-now-be-undone-by-my-need-to-
rehearse-my-evil-plan-out-loud-in-front-of-everyone ǯ
the White House. Speaking to a Nashville, Tennessee, crowd on Wednesday 
evening, the presidentǥdescribed his most recent order as ǲwatered-
down version Ǥǳ
ǫǡ
unconstitutional ban but a little wetter.23 
 
What we are seeing, then, is a key limitation of the figleaf strategy.  This strategy 
does allow for explicit statement of clearly racist views, and for acceptance of 
these by a significant subset of those who accept the Norm of Racial Equality.  It 
does enable a shifting of the normsȄfor this subset of peopleȄregarding what 
one can say without being considered racist.  But there are important 
weaknesses to this strategy.  First, it does not work on everyoneȄmany people 
will see the explicitly racist statements as still racist, despite the figleaves.  
Second (and relatedly), it makes it very hard to effectively return to an 
implicit/dogwhistle strategy- the explicitly racist statements are not so easily 
forgotten by those who have recognized them as such.  And third, discrimination 
law is very interested in whether explicitly racist statements have been made 
regarding the intentions behind particular policies.  Usually, people are careful 
enough not to make these claims.  But the comfort afforded by figleaves led ǯ
courts are viewing as ones of discriminatory intent. 
                                                        
22 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-appeals-
court-maintains-suspension-of-trumps-immigration-
order/2017/02/09/e8526e70-ed47-11e6-9662-
6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.d72c11e20fb9. 
23 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/03/trump_and
_his_cronies_keep_bragging_about_their_muslim_ban_like_dumb_movie.html 
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